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ABSTRACT
Themodel proposed by Merton(1981) to determine the
value of' forecasting ability is adapted to investigate
whether money market fund managers successfully anticipate
changes in the yield curve by adjusting the average maturity
of their portfolios in the right direction. The potential
economic value of' such behavior is assessed, and it is shown
that if the portfolios of all money market fundswere
aggregated it would appear that managers are good forecasters
even if individually they possess insignificant forecasting
ability. At the same time, the economic value of' the aggregate
portfolio will be diminished because of the reduced net change
in average maturity. Thus, diversifying intomany money market
funds will not attain the gain that could be realized if' an
individual manager had a forecasting ability equal to the
quality of the average forecast.
A sample of 34 money market funds is investigated. Analysis
suggests that a small fraction of the funds exhibited forecasting
skills, but even theygenerated negligible economic value because
the changes in their portfolios average maturity were too small.
There appears to be no relationship between forecasting ability
and economic success of money market funds as measured by asset
size and growth.
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I. INTRODUCTION
The performance of investment managers encompasses two elements: (1)
Microforecasting: the ability to forecast price movements of individual
stocks and (2) Macroforecasting:the ability to forecast the performance of
equities relative to fixed income securities.
Merton (1981) motivates the study of macroforecasting bydemonstrating the
staggering value of macroforecasting ability; using monthly returns of
Treasury—bills and a portfolio invested in the NYSE for the period 1927—1978
he demonstrates that a manager who started with 1OOO inJanuary 1927 and
switched funds between these two assets every month with perfectforesight,
would have produced by December 1978 a fund valued atapproximately
5,4OO,OOO,OOO compared with approximately 67,OOO when consistently invested
in the NYSE index. Such numbers explain the zeal of practitioners in
attemptiong to tap this potential reward and attempts by students of finance
to identify above—average macroforecasting talents.
Studies of macroforecasting prior to Merton's (1981) work1 used the
capital asset pricing model (CAPM) to identify the element of macroforecasting
in the overall performance. Merton (1981) and Henriksson and Merton(1981)
develop a more general approach to measure macroforecasting ability.
All of these studies, however, share one common assumption, namely that
managers allocate their funds to one risk—free asset and a portfolio chosen
from a universe of risky securities. The nominally risk—free asset iscommonly taken to be a Treasury—bill of maturity equal to the portfolio
rebalancing interval. A large number of individual and institutional
investors use money—market funds as proxies for risk—freeinvestments.2 The
keen competition among these money—market funds (MMF) for the investor's
dollar inevitably leads to the question of another kind of macroforecasting
ability, i.e., the prediction of short—term movements in the yield curve. The
measurement and economic value of interest rate forecasting by MMF managers is
the subject of this paper.
Two approaches to the study of this question have appeared in print so
far, both by Fern and Oberhelrnan (1981a, 1981b). In the earlier paperFern
and Oberhelman (1981a) use the CAPM framework to measure the performance of
MMFs as they would have with any other portfolio. The trouble with this
approach when applied to MMFs is that it is quite sensitive to thechoice of
benchmark as discussed in Roll (1979). Roll raised the problem with reference
to the identity of a benchmark risky portfolio when the performance of equity
fund managers is measured. In analyzing the performance of MMFs the more
relevant question is the identity of the efficient zero—beta portfolio and its
expected return. The robustness of using T—bills as thebenchmark zero—beta
portfolio in the evaluation of the performance of (very low beta) portfolios
of MMFs is unclear at this point.
In their later study, Fern and Oberhelman (1981b) use an alternative,
indirect approach. They argue that the attempt of MMF managers to apply yield
curve forecasting to their portfolio decison results in acontinuous
adjustment of their portfolios' average maturity. Accordingly, theycorrelate
changes in average maturity with subsequent changes in short—terminterest
rates to judge the forecasting ability of fund managers. Their conclusion is
—2—.that, on average, MMF managers exhibit a significant ability to forecast
changes in interest rates. In developing their methodology, however, Fern
and Oberhelman fail to avoid a number of important pitfalls whichmight be
responsible for their results as will be discussed below.
The present paper uses Merton's (1981) methodology to test theMMF
managers' ability to forecast interest rates. We take special care in
identifying the nature of the changes in interest rates, the forecast of which
is implied by changes in average maturities of MMFportfolios. In contrast to
Fern and Oberhelman (1981b), we do not use theaggregate MMF portfolio.
Rather, we explore the change in average maturity of individual MMFportfolios
relative to subsequent changes in interest rates.
In developing the methodology we estimate the potentialearnings to MMFs
from interest rate forecasting using 1—bill and CD data for the1978—1981
period. We find that the performance of the majority of the MMFs inour
sample of 34 funds did not exhibit a significant ability to forecast
changes
in interest rates over the test period of 1978—1981.At the same time,
however, we find that a few funds exhibited such ability toa statistically
significant degree. Still, because of the low magnitude of the actualchanges
in their portfolio maturities, even those funds could notachieve anywhere
near the potential economic performance (in terms of rates of returnearned)
that would have been possible with such ability.3
We also explain how the aggregation procedurecan account for the upbeat
results of Fern and Oberhelnian (1981b). Section IIdevelops the methodology
of the tests. Results are presented in section III.Section IV concludes.
—3—II. METHODOLOGY
In this paper we take the approach that the forecasting ability of MMF
managers manifests itself in the changes they make in the maturitystructure
of their portfolio. "Forecasting changes in interest rates, however, is not
a clearly defined concept. MMF managers are, at least implicitly, concerned
with changes in the whole relevant range of the term structure of interest
rates (i.e., up to maturity of 1 year) and thus their appropriate response
consists of changes in the full—blown maturity structure of their portfolios.
In empirical research it would be next to impossible to correlate changes in
the entire maturity strucutre of portfolios with the subsequent change in the
entire yield curve. In restricting the nature of the test to some practical
measure one jeopardizes its validity. Thus we first turn our attention to
this issue.
11.1 RELATING CHANGES IN AVERAGE MATURITY TO SUBSEQUENT CHANGES IN INTEREST
RATE S
Fern and Oberhelman (1981b) measure changes in average maturity which
take place over the last one and two weeks of every month. They go on to
measure changes in the yield to maturity of 90—daysecurities4 over the next
one and two months. A successful prediction is recorded if a risein the
90—day yield was preceded by a shortening of the MMF average maturityand vice
versa. This experiment is perfectly valid if the yield curve alwaysremains
flat over the MMF's maturity range. Since the yield curve is, in general,
neither flat nor affected by a mere shift upward or downward, such an
experiment, henceforth referred to as the yield experiment, isoflimited
validity. In particular it is possible that the current forecast of a MMF
—4—manager is for 90 day rates to go up over the prediction horizon, yet
lengthening the average maturity of the portfolio would still yielda better
rate of return than leaving it unchanged. Two possiblecases are shown in
Figure 1.In both cases, 1(a) and 1(b), the initial yieldcurve, y0(t), is
flat and in both cases 90—day yields in the subsequentyield curve y(t)
and y(t), are actually higher. However, the nature of thechange in the
a b entire yield curve for bonds of initial maturity
M0 and M0,
respectively, is such that they could improve their holding period returnby
lengthening their average maturity to M and M.
An alternative experiment restricts the changes in theyield curve over
the holding period to a more general class. Denote theprice, at time s, of a
pure discount bond with maturity, 1, by P(s,T). With a holding period, t, the
final price is P(s+t,T—t) and the holding period return is




Thealternative experiment requires that changes in the yieldcurve during
the interval (s,s÷t) are such that the rate of returnon any pure discount
bond with maturity, T, will be equal to that of a two—bondbenchmark portfolio
with maturities Ti,, 12 so that




Forthis condition to hold it is necessary that holding periodreturns be
linear in maturity, i.e.,
R(s,T) =a5b5T
In order to see the restriction on changes in the yield curveimposed by this
assumption, denote the annual, continuously compoundedyield to maturity at




The linearity of R(s+t,T) in T, together with (3),requires that
Y(s+t,T-t) =Y(s,T)-log(a+bT) (4)
Thus the validity of the experiment requiresthat changes in the yield curve
will be limited to a two—parameter shift givenby:5 -.-log(a+bT) and
forecasters are required to forecast the parameters(a,b). This experiment is
—6—more general than the yield experiment which restricts b=o andaccounts for
the initial maturity so that it does not sufferpitfalls as demonstrated in
Figure 1.
For this experiment in the present study (henceforth calledthe rate of
return experiment) we chose for the benchmarkportfolio the maturities T1=30
days, 12=90 days and the holding period t=7 days. Thuswe recorded a
successful prediction whenever a decrease inaverage maturity for a MMF over a
given week was followed by R(7,30) >R(7,90)for the next week and vice versa.
We undertook to measure the importance of the nature ofthe experiment by
correlating the weekly indicated change in average maturity under thesetwo
alternative experiments. To reiterate, if oneuses the yield experiment, then
a successful prediction is recorded when an increase (decrease) in90—day
yields over a given week is preceded by a decrease (increase)in the average
maturity of a MMF portfolio. If, on the other hand, oneuses the rate of
return test (on 30-. vs. 90—day bonds), then a successfulprediction is
recorded when a higher (lower) rate of return on30—day bonds (relative to
90—day bonds) over a given week is preceded by a decrease(increase) in the
average maturity of a MMF portfolio.
Analysis of the indicated direction of the change inaverage maturity for
the two experiments over the sample period ispresented in Table 1. As Table
1 indicates, the two methods ofmeasuring changes in the yield curve
prescribed identical maturity changes (in direction) for 173 out of206 weeks
(84.0 percent) for 1—bill portfolios and for 101 out of 163weeks (62.0
percent) for Certificates of Deposit portfolios. Since CDs constitutethe
larger share of MMF holdings in the sample (see Table 2), the 62percent
agreement is more indicative of the possible loss of validity in
concentrating
—7—on only one of these experiments above. Onecould seriously misjudge the
prediction of MMF managers from average maturity changes bychoosing,
arbitrarily, one of these two possible experiments (aswell as, perhaps,
others). In the study we use only periods (weeks) for whichboth measurements
of interest rate changes would have led to the same directionof the change in
average maturity. It is assumed thatwhen these two measurements agree it is
unlikely that the nature of the actual changes in the entire yield curveover
these weeks were such that they would have indicated opposite changesin
average maturity in preceding weeks.
We now turn to the issue of the types of securities acutallyheld by the
MMF s.
11.2 THE INTEREST BEARING SECURITIES USED TO MEASURE CHANGES INTHE YIELD
CURVE
MMFs hold, for the most part, three types of securities: Treasurybills
(TB), bank certificates of deposit (CD), and commercial papers(CP). These
securities are not identical, as evidenced by their risk premia. Figure2
shows the risk premia of 90—day CDs over TBs of equal maturities.The graph
demonstrates that the type of bond used to measure yields is important.The
relative holdings of these securiteis by MMF5 has been changing markedly over
time, as is indicated in Table 2.
In order to examine how important it is to use the appropriatebonds when
recording successful and unsuccessful changes in maturities, wecontrast the
prescribed direction of the change in average maturitywhen the yield (or the
rate of return) method is applied to any of the three typesof bonds. Table 3
presents the results for the yield experiment, which weresimilar to those of
—8—the rate of return experiments. Comparing theconsistency of prescribed
changes with the most widely held MMF securities, Table 3(a) indicatesthat
24.7 percent of the weeks provideconflicting results. The consistency of
measurement using TB yields vs. CP and CD is evenworse, with 34.4 percent and
27.1 percent, respectively, conflictingprescriptions. These results raise
another problem with Fern and Oberhelman's (1981b)study which uses CDs
only. In order to avoid the loss of validity due to differentsecurity
holdings by various MMFs, we concentrate on periods for which theindicated
changes in average maturity (as measured with both alternativeways) for all
three security holders agree.
So far we opted to restrict the observations toweeks when a successful
change in average maturity is indicated by both the yield and therate of
return experiments (section 11.1) and to those when thesame successful change
applies to all three major securities: TB, CD, and CP. Table 4summarizes
the number of available observations andreemphasizes the pitfalls from using
observations indiscriminately.
The analysis of maturity changes by MMFs thatwas conducted by Fern and
Oberhelman concerns the average portfolio of all MMFs intheir sample.
Consequently they argue that their favorable conclusion applies tothe average
fund. The validity of this assessment is addressednext.
11.3 SHOULD MMF PORTFOLIOS BE AGGREGATED IN AN EXPERIMENTTO DETERMINE OVERALL
FORECASTING ABILITY BY MANAGERS
Consider a population of N forecasters who aretrying to predict the
outcomes of a binomial process,
—9—Xt —B(O,1;Pt)
Suppose that m of the N forecasters areidentical and superior to the other
n =N—rnforescasters, who are identical also. For simplicity, assumethat the




with conditional probabilities of correct forecasts,
=Pr(Y
=0IX=O) == Pr(Ytt=1lXt=1)=.5 +
em(5a)
for i =1,...,mwhile the inferior forecasters issue forecasts with
=Pr(Vt=0IXt=0)
== Pr(Yt=1Ixt=1)=.5e (5b)
for j= m+1,...,Nand I >em
>en
>0
In this symmetric case the correlation coefficientbetween any forecast
(k=rn,n) and the actual outcome is a statistic of the




—10—for i = 1,...,N,andk = m,n,sothat ek = 0 => = 0 and ek = •
=> = 1 as expected. The relevant question is what happens when the
forecasts are aggretated. Suppose that auser of the forecasts does not know
the superior from the inferior forecasters and henceuses a simple average,
N m N
Vt = 't = r(1t
+
(7) i=1 1 i=1 1 j=m±1 '
Inorder to determine the properties of theaggregate forecast one has to know
the dependence structure. We assume that theconditional forecasts
; i = 1,...,N and k = m,ri
are independent. This means that the unconditional forecastsare dependent.
In particular, the correlation coefficient betweenany two forecasts at time t
is
V) = 4ekel ; k,1 = m,n (8)
so that when em = e 1/2, the correlation isperfect, etc. Under these
circumstances the correlation between theaverage forecast, ''andthe
realization, X, is:
me nem n =
2 22 1/2 (9)
[N/4+(me+ne) .-(mem+ne)]
—11—Consider first the case when all forecastersare identical, i.e., m =0
and n =N.Then,
e
p(Yt,Xt)= 2 2 1/2
(9a)
[e+(1/N)(1/4—er)]
This expression reveals that if theforecasters have absolutely no forecsting
ability, i.e., en =0,their number will make no difference. If,however,
they have some ability, howeversmall, e >0,then
'">p(Y,X)
=1. (10)
This result gives us the first idea aboutresults from aggregate forecasts. A
small forecasting ability of individual managerscan generate a powerful
average forecast when manyforecasts are used. Since most investorsdo not
diversify MMF holdings among many funds,the performance of the average
forecasts might be a misleading statistic.For concreteness, consider the
results reported by Fern and Oberhelman(1981b). They report a measure of
association of Q =.28between the direction of the changein the maturity of
the average MMF portfolio and the subsequentdirection of change in 90—day CD
yield. Using the conditional probabilitiesof P1, P2 for the average MMF
forecast of yield changes, their measureof association, Q, is definedas:6











With a single forecaster's ability, e, the correlationbetween the forecast,




1 1 2.4/2 =-1 (13)
Thus, for Q =.28we arrive at p= .14.If we assume, again, that the
individual managers are identical and issueconditionally independent
forecasts we can use (9) to infer the individualforecasting ablity, e.
The number of MMFs in Fern and Oberhelman'sstudy varies over the sample
period 1975—1980. If we take a reasonableaverage number of N =50MMFs, then
(9) produces a low individual forecasting ability ofe =.01,i.e.,
—13—= p1+P2_1=2e
=1.02.As we will show later, such ability has
little economic value. In our sample of 34 MMFs with weeklydata for the
period 1978—1981, the sample average *forall MMFs was 0.11 and assuming
symmetry and identical ability it implies e =.055.Using (9), we expect a
correlation coefficient for the average forecast of p= .54,implying e =.27
and *= 0.54.The actual statistic for the average portfolio was p* =0.43.
To check whether the actual lower figure is due to the heterogeneityof the
sample we assumed it consists of two classes ofidentical superior and
inferior forecasters. Out of 34 MMF5, the best four exhibited an averageP =
0.38,all significant at the 1 percent level. The best eight exhibited an
average *= 0.31,all significant at the 5 percent level or better. Table 5
presents the implied quality of the averageforecast and demonstrates that the
actual lower average forecast quality is probably not due tothe assumption of
homogeneity. Another cause might be some positiveconditional dependence of
the MMFs forecast ——anissue which is left to a later section.
All in all, the foregoing analysis shows that measuring aggregate
performance may serve as a powerful test todiscover weak forecasting ability
among many forecasters. It should not, however,be misinterpreted as
indicative of strong individual ability from the quality ofthe average
forecast. In the present study we concentrate on theindividual ability of
MMF managements.
We now turn to the discussion of the economic value and the measureto be
used for the individual forecasting ability of MMFs.
—14—11.4 THEPERFORMANCEMEASURE AND EcONqMIc VALUE OF MMF MANAGEMENTS' YIELD
F OR E CA ST r NG
The state of the art of the determination of the economic value of
forecasting ability (applied to stock market timing) is found in Merton
(1981). The case examined by Merton involves a portfoliomanager who limits
his activity to the allocation of investment funds betweena risk—free
security and a prespecified risky asset, say, the market portfolio. Atany
time, t, with a horizon of T periods, the managercompares the known gross
yield to maturity on the risk—free asset, R(t) =1+r(t),with his forecast of
the gross rate of return on the risky portfolio, Z(t)=1+z(t).Defining
perfect foresight as the ability to choose the security with thehigher
ex—post rate of return, Merton shows that a dollar invested by amanager with
perfect foresight yields a rate of return identical to that ofa portfolio
consisting of a dollar invested in the risky security plus a call option,
valued at c(t), on a 1 share in the risky portfolio, withmaturity T and
excercise price R(t)7. Therefore, the economic valueexpressed as a rate of
return premium to perfect foresight is given by,8
c(t) =2N[(1/2)(t)12] -1 (14)
where N [.]isthe cumulative standard normal distribution function, is
the standard deviation of the rate of return on therisky portfolio and the
formula (14) is a simplification of the Black—Schole's calloption valuation
formula when the exercise price equals the risk—free rate.
For our purpose we need to adapt the model to acase where the MMF manager
chooses between two prespecified risky securities,say a 30— and a 90—day
—15—1—bill. Let Z(t) correspond to the rate of return on the longerterm and R(t)
to the stochastic rate of return on the shorter termbond. With perfect
foresight defined as before, a dollar invested bythe manager will yield a
rate of return identical to that of a portfolio consistingof 1 invested in
the short term bond plus a call option on a 1 positionin the long term bond
with the call maturity T and stochastic exercise price R(t).The economic
value of perfect foresight under these conditions istherefore derived from
the value of a call option with a stochastic exercise price[Merton (1973),









with expectation R(t) =exp(cIRT).
The stochastic exercise price for the
call on the longer term bond is exp[R(t)—1] which, followingMerton (1981), we
approximate by R(t). The realized holding periodrate of return on the longer
term bond is
—16—t+ I
Z(t) =exp[aT+ t dw]
with expectation Z(t) =exp(aT).Define
2 2 2 s (t) = +— 2r0R
where s2(t) is the variance rate of the differencebetween the rates of
return on the long and short—term bonds andp is the correlation coefficient
between dWR and dWz. With these parameters theeconomic value of perfect




To measure the economic value of perfectforesight management by MMF
managers, we first observed actual weekly 1—bill prices over theperiod
1978—1981. Specifically, we observed maturitiesas close as possible to 23,
30, 83 and 90 days so that, for example, thecontinuously compounded holding
period return on a 30—day 1—bill over week t is:log B(t,23)/B(t_1,30) .We
then computed the annual realized rate of returnfor three strategies:(i)
hold the 30—day 1—bill, (ii) hold the90—day bill, (iii) hold the bill
which yielded the higher ex—post rate for eachweek. The results of this
experiment for the overall period and two sub—periodsare presented in Table
6. For the overall period of 1978—1981 therealized annual rates of return on
30— and 90—day bills were 10.26 and 10.80percent, respectively, and we assume
that the difference of .56 percentper annum represents risk adjustment. Onthe other hand, the return of 12.28 percent to the perfect foresightstrategy
reflects a risk—free premium of 2.02 percent per annum to perfectforesight
management.
It is well known [Bodie, Kane and McDonald, (1983)]that interest rates
became more volatile (to date) since October 1979, afact which is also
reflected in the table. Commensurately, the premium thatwould have been
realized with perfect foresight over the period 1980—81is 3.24 percent per
year. Note that the standarddeviation for the difference between the
realized rates on 30— and 90—day bills is .72 percent and.94 percent per
annum for the overall period and the 1980—81 subperiod,respectively. These
standard deviations reflect a correlation coefficientbetween the rates of
0.75. Substituting these estimates for s(t) in (15), weobtain a theoretical
estimate of the premium to perfect foresight as 2.11 percentfor the overall
period and 2.75 percent for the 1980—81 period.The theoretical estimates of
the premia from (15) are more reliable than the measured premiabecause the
latter depend on the variance estimate alone (see Merton,1980), while the
empirical ex post measures assume that the period averagesequal ex ante means.
We repeated the same experiment for CD strategies.This experiment has
the empirical problem of lack of data for the 23—and 83—day maturities.
Thus, we approximated BCD(t,23) and BCD(t,83) by BCD(t,3O)
and
BCD(t,9O). Because of theseless reliable estimates, we only report here
that the estimate of the theoretical premium to perfect foresightwith CDs is
2.75 percent over the 1978—81 period (compared to2.11 percent for 1—bills),
reflecting a slightly greater variance of CD ratesand therefore greater
forecasting value.
It is interesting to speculate on the value of perfectforesight if, for
—18—the longer bond, managers used a 180—day instead of a 90—day rnaturity)0 We
use the assumption underlying the validity of the rate of return experiment,
stated by (2) and (4), i.e., that the 180—day 1—bill rate is given by:
R(t,180) =—1.5R(t,3o)+2.5R(t,90)
Thus, using the variance and correlation estimates for R(t,30) and R(t,90),we
obtained a standard deviation for the difference R(t,180) —R(t,30)of 1.72
percent for the 1978—81 period. Substituting this figure into (15) yields a
perfect foresight premium of 5.07 percent per year.'1 Between 1978—79 and
1980—81 periods, MMFs shortened their average maturities reflecting, atleast,
a recognition on their part of less than perfect foresight ability which led
them to forego the larger potential gains.




provide sufficient information to assign economic value to their forecasting
ability. In particular, P* =
P1+P2.....1is a sufficient statistic for that
value which implies that the symmetry in ability(P1=P2) is of no
importance, as well as the symmetry in realization, i.e., whether one outcome
is more frequent. Thus the value of the forecast in (15) adapted toa
specific forecasting ability is p*c(t).
Finally, Merton considers the value of forecasting ability when not all
—19—funds are switched according to the forecast. Specifically, when XR is
invested in the short bond when the forecast is favorable to it (and l_Xk in
the less favorable long bond) and Xk is invested in the short bond when the
forecast favors the long bond, then the value of the forecastbecomes:12
m(t) =A(t)P*c(t) (16)
where A(t) =Xh(t)_Xk(t).




and thus the value of forecasting
ability is prportonal to the change in average maturity as a proportionof the
maturity difference in the bench markbonds.13
Armed with these results we are able to analyze the actual data from our
MMFs sample.
III. PERFORMANCE EVALUATION OF THE MONEY MARKET FUNDS OVER THE PERIOD
1978 —1981
111.1 The Sample Data
The MMF maturity data were obtained from the Donoghue Money Market Fund
report for the period 1978—1981. We kept in the sample all MMFs (34funds)
for which the average maturity was included in all reports. The Report also
lists, in addition to the average maturity, the market value of the portfolio
of the MMFs.
—20—As explained earlier, the weekly observations had to betrimmed down to
include only weeks for which the favorablechange in average maturity is
unambiguous by our assumption about the nature of the change in theyield
curve. The overall number of weeks which qualified for performance
measurement is given in Table 4. The overall number of avaialbleweeks (69)
is not distributed evenly over the period. Table 4 alsoshows the breakdown
for the two—year subperiods, 1978—79 and 1980—81. Therelatively low number
of available weeks for the period 1978—79 (24) rendersestimates for this
subperiod less reliable.
Weekly 90—day yields—to—maturity and realized rates of returnon T—bills
and CDs of 30— and 90—day maturities were taken from theWall Street Journal.
The 90—day CP yields were obtained from Business Week.
111.2 Forecasting Ability
Before we present estimates of forecastingability we should qualify the
results by stating that it is not established that allfunds change maturity
solely in an attempt to exploit yield curve forecasts. The needfor liquidity
and risk preference may, for some periods at least, bean important
consideration. To this extent, estimatates that deriveforecasting ability
from maturity changes may be noisy and thus biaseddownwards in statistical
signficance.
Table 7 summarizes the estimates of the conditional
probabilities, P1
and P2, for the 34 MMFs in the sample for the overallperiod (1978—81) and
the two—year subperiods. The bottom line of the tableshows that, taking the
aggregate portfolio of all MMFs, the combined forecast ispotentially
valuable. The statitistic P* =
P1+P2—1for the aggregate portfolio over
—21—the period is .43, which means that if all funds were to beswitched between
the short and long maturity benchmark securities, these forecastswould retain
43 percent of the value of perfect foresight management. As was arguedin
Section 2.3, however, these results might be driven, at leastin part, by the
sheer number of the MMFs with even marginal forecasting ability.The two
lines next to the bottom of the table show that the simple averageof *for
the 34 MMF5 in the sample is .11, and, when weighted by asset size,.17. (The
difference is not statistically significant and the question ofthe
relationshiup between *andasset size is discussed below.)
The estimates for the overall period show 8 MMFs with *statisticswhich
are significantly different from zero, ranging from.63 to .22. (Note that
the aggregate portfolio performed better than the second best MMF.)
111.3 The Consistency and Symmetry of the Estimated Forecasting Ability
The rank correlation for *betweenthe two subperiods is quite low (.04)
and not significantly different from zero. Because the low forecasting
ability of most MMF5 in the sample may be introducing noiseinto the
correlation estimate, we also use a 2x2 chi—square test to check for
consistency of *overthe subperiods. The chi—square value from the test was
.72 with 1 degree of freedom suggesting that there is no consistencyin
performance over the two subperiods. This result, however,has to be
qualified due to the small number of observations in the early period
(1978—79).
Another interesting question is the symmetry of the estimated forecasting
ability. Here, too, the problem with the aggregate portfolioshows up. The
aggregate portfolio exhibits a signiicantly better abilityto forecast yield
—22—curve changes which favor a reduction in average maturity, i.e.,P1 =.81,
compared to those that favor an increase in average maturity,P2 =.61.But
the estimates for the average MMF tell a different story. Thedifference
between P1 and P2 is smaller and in the opposite direction. Forthe
simple average, P1 =.50and P2 =.61,and the difference is smaller for
the weighted average (P1 =.54,P2 =.62).These numbers suggest that MMF
managers might be able to forecast better yield changes which favor
lengthening the portfolio average maturity.
11.4 Does the Sample Suggest that MMF Managers Are Able Forecasters
The most important question concerning the estimates of *forvarious
MMFs (and their statistical significance) is:To what extent can these
results be attributed to sampling phenomena. To bespecific, Table 7
indicates that 9 MMFs exhibit P greater than .2, i.e., thepotential value of
their forecast is 20 percent (or better) of the value ofperfect foresight.
For each MMF the distribution of the P* statistic ishypergeometric
(Henriksson and Merton, 1981). Suppose that for the i—th MMFwe estimate
=Pr(P*>Q=.2p*0), i.e., the probability that with no forecasting abilitya
sample of observations will yield P*>.2. Using the 34 estimtes of we
have the expected number, n, of MMFs with P*>=.2 (under
H0P. =0;
for i=1,...,34) as E(n) =
Theheavy line in Figure 3 represents the number of MMFs for which the
estimated value exceeds various levels of *Thedashed line (the lowest
line) represents the expected number of MMFs at each level of P*assuming no
forecasting ability on the part of all MMFs in the sample. From these two
graphs one has to conclude that the nuber of "able" MMFs is beyondexpectation
—23—under the null hypothesis of no forecastingability. For Q=.2, for example,
we have 9 MMFs which exceed it comparedwith 2 MMF5 which could be expected to
do so. To assess this inference we construct a graphfor a 95 percent
confidence interval above the expectationline in Figure 3 assuming that MMF
forecasts are independent. This line, while lyingwell above the expectation
line, still shows that some MMF managershave to be considered able
forecasters. For Q=.2, the 95 percent confidencebound is only 5 compared to
the actual (9).
One may question the assumption of independentforecsts, however. To
establish the confidence interval with dependentforecasts we need to estimate
Var(n) =Var(c) when Corr(ct1c) =
>0.In this case, Var( ctj) =
a2+a2+2aa r. ..Thecorrelation coefficient, r. .,isa complex two
i j
13 13
twostage linear transformation of thecorrelation between forecasts, ir =
Corr(Y1V).
First because is a statistic with a binomial
distribution and second because the statistics (underlying the aj)
is hypergeometrically distributed. Thus it requiresa stretch of the
imagination to use the forecast correlationmatrix, toinfer r1. As
a first step we consider the foundationof the independence assumption. This
would require the independence of the conditionalforecasts:
=Corr(Y1Y
lengthening maturity is favorable)
=Corr(YY
shortening maturity is favorable)
Table 8 indicates that both sets of conditionalcorrelation coefficients
appear to be distributed normallywith a mean of .05, which is statistically
significant. It is interesting to checkwhether the conditional correlation
—24—coefficients are different among the top 8 MMFs.In Table 8 the mean of p(—)
is .08 and for p(+) is .03. In both cases themeans are not significantly
different from those of the overall sample. The correlationcoefficients
between the unconditional forecasts have a mean of .04 witha standard
deviation of .082 (somewhat surprisingly) similar to thoseof the conditional
forecasts. These correlation coefficients could be used toestimate the
correlation between the statistic (r) only if the transformation were
linear. Yet, since the data suggest that the must be correlated, we use
these means as justification to present therange of .05—.10 for r1 in
constructing the confidence limits as our best guess. Theremaining two lines
in Figure 3 show the 95 percent confidence limits basedon =.05and
.10. The higher line of the two (forr1 =.10)traces the actual graph
almost exactly except for the single, top MMF whichlogged P* =.62.Thus the
question of whether the forecasting ability demonstratedby the MMFs is just a
sample phenomenon cannot be answered with confidencealthough the evidence
seems to favor the hypthesis that a small number of MMFmanagers did exhibit
superior forecasting skills.
111.5 The Actual Economic Value of the MMFsForecasting Ability
It is tempting to try to relate the actual rates ofreturn for the various
MMFs to their demonstrated forecasting ability. Apriori, the difficulties in
this approach are mainly two: First, a good number ofthese funds use the
amortized premium accounting method which would obscureany distinction of
performance which is attributable to forecasting ability.Second, the
constant change of the MMFs' portfolio composition in termsof the various
securities would make it impossible to separate thetiming from the selection
—25—skills, if any. Finally, using actual returnswould imply that ex post
returns can be taken to reflect ex ante means.Thus we have to resort to the
indirect method explained in Section 2.4, where wemade additional use of
Mertori's (1981) model. We showed that under our assumptions,with the
benchmark securities being T—bills of 30— and 90—daymaturity, the economic
value of their forecasting skills is given by p*c(t).We have shown above
that c(t) is of the order of magnitude of 2 percent premiumto the annual risk
adjusted rate of return. There are 8 MMFs whichexceed p*.22 with
statistical significance and hence could potentiallyrealize 22—62 percent of
that premium. What factor, ,shouldbe used for this potential annual gain
of p*c(t) =.5—1.5percent Table 9 presents the average change in maturity
(in days) over the sample period. The firstcolumn shows the averages for the
weeks used to measure performance. The first panelaccounts for the overall
period. These numbers show that the best fourMMFs behaved similarly to the
other 28. Using 3 days as the average change in maturity yields=3/60=
.05,which is so low as to practically eliminate any potential gainfrom
forecasting ability. Note also that the aggregate portfolio averagechange in
maturity (1.73 days) reflects the interfund forecastvariability and assures
that whatever advantage one obtains from forecast averaging(P*=.43) might be
lost by averaging the intended maturity change, since .03.
We are led to conclude that even if some of the MMF managershave any
forecasting ability they either lack in confidence orin recognition of their
own skills or, more likely, are prevented byinstitutional constraints from
taking advantage of them. The second columnin Table 9 is presented for a
good reason. It shows that the weeks usedto measure performance are not
significantly different in terms of maturitydecisions from other weeks, and
—26—if at all, the changes during these weeksare actually smaller. Recall that
the weeks used for performance evaluationare those for which the 90—day yield
changes and the realized rate of return differentialbetween 30— and 90—day
securities of the three bond types (TB,CP, CD) all favor the same directional
change in maturity. One expects these weeks tocoincide with relatively
severe changes in the yield curve. Table 10 showsthat this is indeed the
case. The changes in yields and rate of returndifferentials are double or
more for the weeks used to measure performance. Ifit is easier to forecast
more severe changes in the yieldcurve, then our performance measurement in
the preceding section is biased in favor ofMMF managers. This, however, is
probably not the case since changes inaverage maturity are not larger during
these weeks, indicating thatmanagers, at least, do not feel that way.
111.6 The Relationship BetweenForecasting Ability and Asset Size and Growth
As Table 8 indicated, the weightedaverage of P for the MMF sample (.17)
is higher than the simpleaverage (.11). This raises the question of whether
the managers of larger MMFspossess better forecasting skills. Since the
management fee is proportional to asset size, one wouldexpect that larger
MMFs will be able to allocate moreresources to yield curve forecasting and
thus, if it is at all possible, should perform better.Table 11 suggests that
this propostiion is not supported by theevidence, either because larger MMFs
do not allocate more resources toforecasting or that additional resources do
not result in better forecasts. Thesimple and Spearman rank correlation
coefficients between *andasset size either at the end of 1978 or 1981are
low and not significantly different fromzero.
A related question is whether revealedforecasting ability results in the
—27—success of a MMF as a business, when measured bythe rate of growth in asset
size over the period 1978—81. The simple and rankcorrelation coefficients
between P and the magnitude of assets growth as showin Table 11 indicate
that the answer to this question is also negative. Thiscould be a result of
the fact that investors recognize, as we showed earlier,that even MMFs with
revealed forecasting ability did not generate any significanteconomic value.
Of course, one cannot reject the conclusion that forecastingability goes
unrewarded in the market place which, in turn, explains whythe larger MMFs
would not try harder, which in turn explains why there is nocorrelation
between size and performance.
IV. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
Previous investigation suggested that money market fund managers
demonstrated ability to anticipate changes in short term yields by changing
their portfolio average maturity in the directionconsidered consistent with
subsequent changes in the yield curve. This paperdemonstrated that the
question was inadequately addressed by (1) aggregatingthe sample MMF
portfolios, (ii) measuring their performancewith inadequate statistics,
(iii)determining the adequate direction of change onthe basis of
subsequent changes in the 90—day yield to maturityand (iv) using CDs as
representative of the money market fund portfolio composition.We proceeded
to observe the maturity behavior of individual moneymarkt funds and adopted
Merton's (1981) model to measure the forecasting skillsand economic value of
yield curve management by money market fund mangers.
We recorded the adequacy of changes in portfolio maturityin a way which
is valid up to a two parameter shift in the yield curve.We used only weeks
—28—when the favorable direction of change in portfoliomaturity is consistent for
1—bills, CDs and CPs whether the benchmark is the subsequentchange in the
90—day yield to matuirity or the difference in the realized rate ofreturn on
30— vs. 90—day securities.
Results show that some funds do demonstrate forecastingability.
Measuring the average weekly change in maturity, however, shows that these
were sufficiently small to devoid the demonstrated skills ofany economic
value. It was also shown that largermoney market fund mangers do not
demonstrate better forecasting skills and that, inturn, revealed forecasting
skills are not rewarded by faster growth in themoney market fund assets.
—29—Figure 1
Examples of Changes in Yield Curves from Y0(t)
to Y1(t), which Favors Changes in Maturityof
Same Direction as the Changes in 90 DayYield.
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.1 .2 .3Table 2
Composition (a) of Bond Holdings by MMFs
(percent of total assets)
Types Average
of Bonds 1978 1979 1980 1981 78 —81
TBs 14.6 11.7 15.7 13.2 13.8
COs 31 .3 20.9 16.0 16.1 21 .2
CPs 30.7 35.8 40.0 34.5 35.3
Others(b) 23.4 31.6 28.3 36.2 29.9
Total 100 100 100 100 100
Notes:
a. Average of percentage holdings of each typeof bond by 34 sample MMFs.
b. Includes Repurchase Agreement, Banker's Acceptance,Eurodollar CDs,
etc.
—34—Table 3
Direction of Prescribed Changes in Average Maturity
of MMF Portfolios Holding Different Bonds
as Measured by the Yield Method
















































Total Number of Weekly Observations for
the Period 1978—1981 Broken Down by Direction
of Indicated Maturity Change and Agreement Betweenthe Types
of Bond Held and Experiments (Yield and Rate of Return)
Yield or Rate of
Direction of Return of All
Indicated Types of Bond Securities (TB, CD,
Change in CP) Indicate Same
Types of Average
Direction of
Experiment Maturity TB CPCD Maturity Change
Shorten 107 101 102 50
Yields Lengthen 997661 33
(90 days) Total 206 177 163 88
Rate of Shorten 86 — 85 57
Return Lengthen 120—117 77
(30— vs. 90— Total 206—202 134
days bonds)
Both Shorten 80— 55 37
ExperimentsLengthen 93— 46 32
Agree Total 173—101 69
Note: The distribution of the weeks used for performancemeasurement is not
even across the 2 year subperiods:
Lengthen Shorten
Total Weeks Used Maturity Maturity
Total 69 32 37
1978—79 24 16 8
1980—81 45 21 24
—36—Table 5
Simulations of the Results of Aggregation of MMFs Portfolios
Using Actual Data from the 34 MMFs in the Sample
Breaking the Sample into Breaking the Sample into
8 Superior and 26 Inferior 4 Superior and 30 Inferior
MMF Managements MMF Managements
=8,n =26,n/rn =3.25 m =4,n =30,n/rn =7.5
Average Statistics in the Actual Sample
for the Superior Managements
=1.31; e =.155 P1+P2 =1.38; e =.190
Average Statistics in the Actual Sample
for the Inferior Managements
=1.05;e =.025 =1.07; e =.035
Assuming Conditional Independence and Using en, em, m, n
from the Sample, Equation (8) Predicts the Following
Aggregation Results
p=.55 p=.53
= 1.55;e =.275 Pi+P2 =1.53;e =.265
At this Stage, Will the Addition of
Inferior Forecasters Improve the
Quality of the Average Forecasta
No Yes




then adding an inferior forecaster will actually improve thequality of the
average forecast.
—37—Table 6
Realized Rates of Return on T—bill Strategies
with 30— and 90—Day Maturities for 1978—1981
Strategy 1978—81 1980—81 1978—79
Hold 30—Day Bill Mean (percent 10.26 12.14 8.41
annual ized)
Standard Deviation .55 .60 .34
Hold 90—Day Bill
Mean 10.80 13.32 8.31
Standard Deviation 1.04 1.26 .56
Switch with Perfect Foresight
Mean 12.28 15.38 9.20
Premium Over 30—Day Bill 2.02 3.24 .79
Difference Between 90—
and 30—Day Rates
Mean .54 1.19 —.10
Standard Deviation .72 .94 .38
—38—Table 7
Estimates of the Forecasting Ability of MMFs
for the Period 1978—1981
Estimation Periods
1978 —1981 80—81 78—T9
Fund ID No. P1 P2 P1P2 P1-+-P2 P1P2 58 .74 .88 1.62 1.70 1.46
50 .67 .66 1.32 1 .27 1 .60
15 .65 .66 1.31 1.27 1.35
16 .60 .67 1 .27 .93 1.76
11 .54 .71 1.26 1.05 1.43
2 .55 .70 1.25 1.17 1.37
34 .64 .58 1.22 1.25 1.10
81 .52 .70 1.22 1.24 .95
71 .61 .61 1.22 1 .15 1 .19
84 .58 .61 1.19 1.31 .90
32 .52 .65 1.17 1.01 1 .53
41 .56 .60 1.16 1.05 1.23
26 .60 .55 1.15 1 .03 1.21
12 .58 .57 1.14 1.10 1.37
43 .58 .55 1.14 1 .06 1.37
64 .54 .59 1.13 1.05 1.29 62 .48 .65 1.13 1.11 1.17 3 .44 .67 1.11 1.09 1.24
88 .43 .66 1.09 1.00 1.23
1 .42 .66 1.07 1.04 1.27
72 .48 .59 1.06 .88 1.47
74 .48 .58 1.06 1.02 1.33
7 .43 .62 1 .04 .93 2.00 96 .44 .59 1.03 1.04 .96
33 .45 .58 1.03 1.07 1.50 68 .47 .57 1.03 1.00 .89
48 .43 .60 1 .03 .97 1 .07
66 .48 .54 1.02 .94 .89
90 .50 .50 1.00 .70 1.50
21 .31 .63 .93 1.09 .56
5 .40 .50 .90 .87 1 .00 19 .43 .45 .88 .97 .90
42 .32 .56 .87 .89 .78 60 .25 .57 .82 .68 1.00
Simple Average .50 .61 1.11 1.05 1.21
Weighted Average .54 .62 1.17 1.09 1.21
(by Assets Size)
MMF Portfolio .81 .61 1.43 1.34 1.67
—39—Table 8
Mean and Standard Deviation of the Correlation





Maturity Is .047 .179
Favored (—)
Lengtheningof
Maturity Is .046 .206
Favored (÷)
TopB MMF5
Shortening (—) .079 .200
Lengthening (4-) .031 .163
Y =1if maturity shortened
0 if maturity is lengthened
—40—Table 9
Average Weekly Changes in the MMF Portfolio
Average Maturity
(in days, 34 MMFs, 1978—1981)
For the Weeks For All Weeks
Used to in the Period
Measure (208 Weeks in
Performance 1978—81)
1978—81
Top 4 MMFs 2.94 3.58
Other 28 MMFs 3.14 3.52
Aggregated
MMF Portfolio 1.73 2.07
1980—81
Top 4 MMFs 2.65 2.66
Other 28 MMFs 2.57 2.87
Aggregated
MMF Portfolio 1.66 1.70
1980—81
Top 4 MMFs 3.85 4.46
Others 4.08 4.18
Aggregated
MMF Portfolio 1.86 2.44
—41—Table 10
Average Magnitude of Changes in the 90—DayYield to
Maturity and Difference in Realized Rates of Return



















TB CD CP TB CD
.244
.029 .022 —.239 —.266 —.462
.674 .693 .439 —.056 —.061
.097
—42—Table 11
Performance, Asset Size and Growth During 1978—81
(Simple and Spearman Rank Correlation Coefficients)
AST78 AST81 Growth AVAST
AST78 .70 —.29 .69 .22
AST81 .72 — .08 .99 .24
Growth —.49 .18 — .06 —.28
AVAST .74 .99 .15 — .24
.21 .03 —.14 .04 —
Upperright corner: Simple correlation coefficients.
Down left: Spearman rank correlation coefficients.
A5178(AS181): Asset size of a MMF in 1978(1981)
AVAST: Average of AST78 and AST81
—43—Footnotes
1. See Merton (1980) and I-ienriksson and Merton(1981) for references.
2. For example, as of June 1981 the totalmarket value of short term
financial assets (i.e., T—bills of up to 6 month maturity,CPs, CDs and
bankers' acceptances) was 574.5 billion dollarsand the total market value
of the assets held by money market funds amountedto 126.4 billion
dollars, dispersed among slightly more than100 funds.
3. We do not confront the question of whtherMMFs should even attempt to do
so. One can argue that MMF5 should precommitthemselves to specific
maturities and short—term instruments and leavethe interest rates
forecasting theatre to managers of interest futuresfunds. It is also
possible that these funds restrictedthemselves in changing their
portfolio maturity due to risk consideration.
4. We relegate the discussion of the identity ofthe bonds to a later section.
5. This restriction of the nature of the changein the yield curve implies,
implicitly, the expectation hypothesis, forif the yield curve
incorporates liquidity premia,. then thelefthand side in (4) must include
the adjustment term for the liquidity premium.
6. See Kendall and Stuart (1977, pp. 536—538), ascited by Fern and
Oberhelman (1981b).
7. This portfolio is also identical to a 1 sharein the risky portfolio plus
a put option on that share with a maturityT and exercise price R(t).
8. The expression in (14) assumes that the managercollects fees (if any) at
the end of the period. Merton assumes thatin equilibrium, fees equal to
the economic value are decucted up front, so that perdollar invested by
client, the value is c(t)I[1+c(t)].
—44—9. If the holding period, T (which is in our case one week), is short
relative to the maturity of the bond (30 or 90 days in our case), then the
assumption of a constant mean and variance rates (c&,a2) for the price
dynamics is reasonable.
10. Note that over the period 1978—79 the average maturity of the MMFs in the
sample was around 70—90 days, which was reduced to around 25—35 days
during the next subperiod.
11. Merton's results for the market portfolio with, say, 20 percent annual
standard deviation is 43.7 percent.
12. This result requires the assumption that securities are priced to satisfy
the security market line.
13. Note that changing the benchmark bonds will also change the variance of
the rate difference in c(t) and leave the economic value of the forecast
unchanged —ifthe assumption of the linearity of rates in maturity is
preserved.
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